In South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Pimienta, the South Carolina Supreme Court held on July 31, 2026 that due process permits courts to use the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in a child-protection intervention proceeding. Not every proceeding affecting a family carries the same constitutional stakes.

Gerardo Pimienta relied on Santosky v. Kramer, where the United States Supreme Court required clear and convincing evidence before a state may terminate parental rights. Santosky emphasized the permanent, irrevocable nature of termination: it destroys the legal parent-child relationship and eliminates rights to custody, visitation, and communication.

The proceeding against Pimienta was different. DSS sought a finding of abuse, protective intervention, and placement of his name on the Central Registry—not termination of parental rights. Under South Carolina law, an intervention finding may authorize protective services or a treatment plan. It does not permanently sever family ties, and its consequences are not final and irrevocable like termination.

That distinction mattered under the due-process framework discussed in Santosky. Courts consider the private interest affected, the risk of an erroneous decision under the chosen procedure, and the government’s countervailing interest. Because intervention imposes a less severe and less permanent intrusion than termination, the private interest did not demand the heightened clear-and-convincing standard. Santosky itself recognized that people facing the forced dissolution of parental rights need greater procedural protection than those resisting state involvement in ongoing family affairs.

The Court stressed that Pimienta was AP’s former stepfather and had no parental rights concerning her. His effort to invoke the constitutional protection afforded to a natural parent facing permanent severance was therefore weak.

There was a procedural problem: Pimienta challenged provisions governing DSS’s internal determination and removal cases, not the provision governing the intervention hearing. He failed to challenge the separate preponderance standard for Central Registry placement. Even overlooking those defects, the Court found the intervention standard constitutional.

The ruling draws a line: clear and convincing evidence is required for the extraordinary, permanent destruction of parental rights; preponderance remains appropriate for protective intervention, where the court simply asks whether abuse is more likely than not.