On March 20, 2026, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued an opinion in Jay v. Jay, No. 97A25, addressing a recurring issue in domestic violence protective order (DVPO) litigation: what qualifies as “competent evidence” sufficient to support a trial court’s findings of fact. While the appeal nominally focused on the form of the trial court’s findings under Rule 52 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court’s reasoning offers guidance on how to ensure that evidence becomes “competent” in practice and a DVPO cannot be challenged.

The Core Holding

The Court affirmed the DVPO, holding that competent evidence supported the trial court’s findings, even though the trial court incorporated a party’s unverified written statement by reference into it's written ruling. Crucially, the Court emphasized that the findings were binding on appeal so long as they were supported by competent evidence, and the trial court has meaningfully engaged in evaluating that evidence.

What Is “Competent Evidence”?

Although the Court did not redefine the term, Jay v. Jay reinforces the fundamental rule that:

“Competent evidence” is evidence that the trial court can properly consider and rely upon—particularly after assessing credibility—such that it supports the ultimate findings of fact.

This Jay illustrates three key principles.

1. Sworn Testimony Can Make Otherwise Unreliable Evidence Reliable

A central issue was that the trial court relied in part on an unverified written statement attached to the plaintiff’s complaint. Standing alone, such a statement would raise reliability concerns—as stated in the Jay dissent.

However, the Supreme Court held that the statement became competent evidence because it was:

• Corroborated by sworn testimony at the hearing, and
• Tested through the adversarial process, including cross-examination and competing testimony.

The Court emphasized that the trial judge heard both parties testify and used that testimony to evaluate the credibility of the written allegations. Thus, live testimony can “elevate” documentary allegations into competent evidence.

2. The Credibility of the Evidence Is Central

The opinion repeatedly underscores that competent evidence is inseparable from credible evidence. Evidence is not “competent” in a vacuum—it becomes competent when the trial court:

• Evaluates its reliability,
• Weighs it against competing evidence, and
• Makes implicit or explicit credibility determinations.

Here, the trial judge:

• Compared the written statement to in-court testimony, and
• Struck through portions of the statement that he determined were not credible.

The Court’s selective adoption showed that the Court did not blindly accept allegations but instead filtered them through a credibility analysis. That process satisfied Rule 52 and supported a finding that the remaining evidence was competent.

3. “Mere Recitations” Are Not Enough

The Court reaffirmed prior precedent that “mere recitations” of allegations or testimony are insufficient to constitute proper findings. However, Jay clarifies an important nuance:

• A “mere recitation” becomes competent evidence when the trial court considers it and judges it favorably (i.e. credibly.)

In other words, the defect is not the use of documentary or secondhand material—it is the failure of the court to evaluate it.

Practical Takeaways

For practitioners—especially in DVPO and family court proceedings—Jay v. Jay offers several practice pointers:

1. Corroborate written allegations with live testimony. Even unverified statements can support a DVPO finding if corroborated in court.
2. Build a record. The record must show that the trial Court assessed the credibility of all evidence upon which it relied in issueing the DVPO.
3. Expect deference on appeal. A determination that the trial Court relied upon competent evidence will require that factual findings be binding.
4. Encourage explicit findings. The Supreme Court again noted that incorporation by reference is not best practice, even if permissible.

Conclusion

Jay v. Jay does not radically redefine “competent evidence,” but it provides a good example of how the concept operates in real litigation. Evidence becomes “competent” not merely by existing in the record, but by being tested, corroborated, and evaluated by the trial court. Appellate courts will defer when trial judges do the work of evaluating evidence—even if their written findings are imperfect.