In Zubchevich v. Zubchevich, No. COA25-796 (N.C. Ct. App. July 15, 2026), the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance of a Domestic Violence Protective Order (DVPO) against a father who physically removed his seven-year-old son from one side of a vehicle and forced him into his car seat.

The father's primary argument on appeal was that the evidence did not support the trial court's finding that he had intentionally caused bodily injury, an essential element of domestic violence under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(a)(1). He maintained that he merely exercised reasonable parental authority by moving his son into the proper seat and that no legally recognizable bodily injury occurred.

The Court of Appeals disagreed. The evidence showed that the father grabbed the child by the neck and hip, causing the child to become red in the face, cry, experience difficulty breathing, and feel "weird" and "dizzy." The child's sister testified that he continued breathing heavily during the drive to school, and a responding police officer corroborated the child's description of the incident. The appellate court concluded this constituted competent evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the father intentionally caused bodily injury.

In reaching its decision, the court rejected the father's invitation to adopt a narrow definition of "bodily injury" requiring proof of significant physical harm or lasting impairment. Instead, the court relied on prior North Carolina decisions recognizing that relatively limited physical injuries—including choking, striking a child causing a swollen lip, and a minor laceration caused by a vehicle—may satisfy the statutory requirement when intentionally inflicted. The court emphasized that it is the legislature's role, not the judiciary's, to redefine the statutory language.

The decision underscores an important principle in North Carolina family law: while parents retain broad authority to discipline and control their children, that authority is not absolute. When a parent's intentional physical conduct results in bodily injury—even if the injury is not severe—a trial court may conclude that domestic violence has occurred and issue a protective order. The case illustrates that appellate courts will defer to a trial judge's factual findings when supported by competent evidence and will not reweigh witness credibility on appeal.

Guy Vitetta, Charleston SC