The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Hemani is another very significant Second Amendment rulings following along the lines of Bruen and Rahimi, but it is equally important for what it does not do. Contrary to some early commentary, the Court did not hold that all users of controlled substances have a constitutional right to possess firearms, nor did it invalidate 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) in all applications. Instead, the Court rejected the government’s attempt to automatically disarm an otherwise law-abiding marijuana user without any individualized showing of dangerousness.

Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion focused on the Supreme Court’s historical-tradition framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. Under that test, the government must demonstrate that a modern firearms restriction is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The government argued that marijuana users are analogous to “habitual drunkards” who historically could be subjected to certain restrictions. The Court found the analogy unpersuasive. Historical laws generally targeted individuals whose substance abuse rendered them incapable of managing their affairs or posed a demonstrable threat to themselves or others. By contrast, the federal government’s interpretation of §922(g)(3) automatically disarmed anyone who regularly used any controlled substance, regardless of quantity, effect, or actual dangerousness.

The government admitted that Ali Hemani was not an addict, had no history of violence, and possessed a firearm only in his home. The prosecution rested entirely on his admission that he used marijuana several times a week. The Court concluded that historical analogues simply did not support such a sweeping prohibition.

Importantly, the Court repeatedly emphasized the narrowness of its holding. It expressly declined to address firearm restrictions on addicts, persons who are presently intoxicated, individuals shown to be dangerous because of their drug use, or statutes aimed at particularly dangerous drugs. It also specifically stated that it was not addressing the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute, §922(g)(1).

The Court’s treatment of marijuana is particularly noteworthy. The Court observed that the federal government itself has relaxed enforcement against marijuana users, that most states now permit marijuana use in some form, and that marijuana has been moved from Schedule I to Schedule III. Those developments undermined the government’s argument that all regular marijuana users are categorically dangerous persons who may be disarmed without individualized proof.

The more intriguing aspect of the case may be Justice Thomas’s concurrence. Although he joined the Second Amendment analysis, he separately argued that §922(g) itself may exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. Thomas questioned the longstanding rule that Congress may criminalize possession of a firearm merely because the firearm crossed state lines at some point in the past. He argued that such a theory effectively grants Congress a general police power, something the Constitution reserves to the states.

That concurrence should attract significant attention. Since United States v. Lopez (1995), the Supreme Court has occasionally limited Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, but it has never revisited the constitutionality of §922(g) itself. Thomas suggests that the statute’s “minimal nexus” requirement—a firearm having once traveled in interstate commerce—may be constitutionally insufficient. If his view gains traction, future litigants may challenge not only §922(g)(3), but potentially other subsections of §922(g), including the felon-in-possession prohibition.

Does Hemani foreshadow a broader challenge to the Controlled Substances Act itself? Probably not directly. The majority’s opinion repeatedly focused on the lack of historical support for categorically disarming marijuana users, not on Congress’s authority to regulate drugs. However, Thomas’s concurrence signals a willingness to revisit the modern understanding of the Commerce Clause. If a future Court were to adopt a more originalist interpretation of congressional commerce power, litigants could eventually argue that both federal firearms restrictions and portions of the Controlled Substances Act exceed Congress’s constitutional authority when applied to purely intrastate conduct.

For now, however, Hemani should be understood as a limited ruling: the Supreme Court held that the government cannot automatically strip an otherwise law-abiding marijuana user of Second Amendment rights based solely on marijuana use. It is not a blanket victory for all controlled-substance users, nor does it invalidate §922(g) wholesale. Yet Justice Thomas’s concurrence may prove to be the most consequential part of the case if it becomes the foundation for future challenges to both federal gun laws and the modern scope of the Commerce Clause.

Guy Vitetta, Charleston