The widely followed Lindsay Clancy murder trial in Massachusetts has focused public attention on an issue trial lawyers regularly confront: What may a judge do when jurors say they cannot reach a unanimous verdict?

The Massachusetts jury reported more than once that it was unable to agree. The trial judge eventually delivered that state’s version of a “dynamite charge,” an instruction intended to encourage jurors to reconsider their positions without surrendering their individual judgment.

South Carolina uses a similar procedure, commonly called an Allen charge. But a judge’s authority to encourage further deliberations is not unlimited. The instruction must remain balanced and noncoercive, and state law imposes an important restriction after a jury reports a second genuine deadlock.

What Is an Allen Charge?

An Allen charge takes its name from the United States Supreme Court’s 1896 decision in Allen v. United States. It is sometimes called a “dynamite charge” because it is intended to break an apparent jury impasse.

The instruction ordinarily reminds jurors to:

• Listen carefully to one another;
• Reconsider their positions with an open mind;
• Evaluate their conclusions in light of the other jurors’ views; and
• Continue attempting to reach a unanimous verdict, if they can do so without compromising their individual judgment.

A judge may encourage meaningful deliberation. The judge may not pressure jurors into returning a verdict merely for the sake of reaching an agreement.

South Carolina’s Statutory Rule

Section 14-7-1330 of the South Carolina Code governs what may happen when a jury reports that it cannot agree.

After a jury has engaged in “due and thorough deliberation” and reports a first deadlock, the court may restate some or all of the evidence, explain the applicable law again, and return the jury for further deliberations.

The statute becomes more restrictive after the jury reports a second deadlock. At that point, the jury may not be sent out to deliberate again without its consent unless it asks the court for an additional explanation of the law.

The statute applies to juries in “any cause,” and South Carolina appellate courts have applied it in civil and criminal cases.

The Lindsay Clancy Trial: A Massachusetts Comparison

The Clancy trial provides a useful real-time comparison because Massachusetts has a remarkably similar statutory rule.

Clancy is being tried in Plymouth Superior Court on charges arising from the deaths of her three children. The central trial issue is whether she was criminally responsible for her conduct or not guilty by reason of insanity.

After several days of deliberations, the jury reported that it could not reach a unanimous decision. When the jury continued to report an impasse, Judge William Sullivan delivered what Massachusetts calls a Tuey-Rodriquez charge.

The Tuey-Rodriquez instruction serves substantially the same function as an Allen charge. It asks jurors to give serious consideration to opposing views while cautioning them against abandoning conscientiously held convictions merely to produce a verdict.

As of the morning of September 4, 2026, the Clancy jury had completed six days of deliberations without reaching a verdict and was returning for a seventh day. The jury had twice advised the court that it could not agree. After the foreperson subsequently reported that one juror was not following the reasonable-doubt instruction, the judge questioned the jurors individually, declined a defense request to remove a juror, reinstructed the jury on reasonable doubt, and permitted deliberations to continue.

That later reasonable-doubt instruction should be distinguished from another full dynamite charge. A court may respond to a request or apparent need for clarification of a specific legal principle without necessarily repeating the entire deadlock instruction.

Massachusetts General Laws chapter 234A, section 68C provides that, after “due and thorough deliberation,” a jury that returns a second time without reaching a verdict may not be sent out again without its consent unless it asks for further explanation of the law.

That language is nearly identical to South Carolina Code section 14-7-1330.

The comparison reveals an important point: the number of jury notes does not necessarily determine the legal outcome. A trial judge must decide whether a communication represents a genuine deadlock following due and thorough deliberation, a premature expression of difficulty, or a request for clarification of the law.

How Many Times May a South Carolina Judge Give an Allen Charge?

South Carolina law does not establish a simple numerical rule stating that an Allen charge may be given only once—or no more than twice.

Instead, the law focuses on the number of genuine deadlock reports, the adequacy of the jury’s deliberations, and whether further deliberation is voluntary.

In the usual sequence:

1. The jury reports its first genuine deadlock after meaningful deliberation.
2. The judge may give a properly worded Allen charge and return the jury for additional deliberations.
3. If the jury reports a second genuine deadlock, the judge may not simply order the jurors to continue.
4. Further deliberations are permitted only if the jury consents or asks for an additional explanation of the law.

Accordingly, one Allen charge following the first deadlock is the ordinary practice. A second or repeated charge is not expressly prohibited in every conceivable circumstance, but it cannot be used to evade the statutory restriction or force an unwilling jury to continue.

Repetition also increases the possibility that the process, viewed as a whole, will be found coercive.

What Constitutes Jury Consent?

In Buff v. South Carolina Department of Transportation, the South Carolina Supreme Court explained that, after a jury has twice reported a deadlock, the judge should diplomatically discuss whether further deliberations could be beneficial.

The jury’s consent may be express or implied from its response and conduct. The judge is not necessarily required to tell the jury explicitly that it has a right to stop deliberating. Nevertheless, the record should demonstrate that the jury was willing to continue.

If the jury unequivocally states that additional deliberation would not make a difference, the judge cannot force another attempt.

That was the situation in State v. Robinson. After receiving an Allen charge, the jury again reported that it could not agree. When the judge asked whether additional time might help, the jury responded that further deliberation would not make a difference. The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that declaring a mistrial was not merely permissible—it was required.

When Does an Allen Charge Become Coercive?

An Allen charge is evaluated in context and under the totality of the circumstances. Because of its potential to pressure jurors, the instruction receives greater scrutiny than an ordinary jury charge.

South Carolina courts consider factors including:

• Whether the instruction was directed specifically toward minority jurors;
• Whether the judge suggested that the jury had to reach a verdict;
• Whether the judge asked about the jury’s numerical division;
• Whether the judge knew the numerical split before giving the charge;
• The length of deliberations before the charge;
• The length of deliberations after the charge;
• The total duration and circumstances of the deliberations; and
• Whether the charge told jurors not to surrender conscientiously held beliefs merely to obtain unanimity.

No single factor necessarily controls. The question is whether the judge’s words and conduct, viewed as a whole, improperly pressured the jury or undermined the jurors’ independence.

What Should a Proper Allen Charge Include?

A properly balanced instruction should address majority and minority jurors evenhandedly. Both groups may be encouraged to consider the other side’s reasoning.

Critically, the jury should be told that every juror remains responsible for reaching an individual decision based on the evidence and the law. No juror should surrender a conscientiously held belief merely to agree with other jurors or bring the case to an end.

The judge also should avoid:

• Directing the instruction only toward holdout jurors;
• Stating or implying that the jury must reach a verdict;
• Threatening prolonged or indefinite deliberations;
• Suggesting that jurors will be confined until they agree;
• Repeatedly emphasizing the expense or inconvenience of a retrial; or
• Asking the jury how it is numerically divided.

An unsolicited disclosure of the jury’s numerical division does not automatically require a mistrial. Nevertheless, South Carolina courts have advised judges to tell jurors not to disclose their numerical split.

The South Carolina Supreme Court’s Warning in State v. Rampey

The South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Rampey illustrates how an Allen charge can cross the constitutional line.

The trial judge repeatedly emphasized the resources expended in bringing the case to trial and told the jurors that the parties deserved finality and a verdict. At the same time, the charge omitted the critical warning that no juror should surrender a conscientiously held belief merely to reach an agreement.

The Supreme Court concluded that the instruction was unconstitutionally coercive and required a new trial. The Court also held that asking jurors after the verdict whether they had been coerced did not cure the defective charge.

The case provides an important reminder: a hung jury and mistrial are legally permissible outcomes. Jurors may be encouraged to deliberate, but they cannot be told—directly or indirectly—that failing to reach a verdict is unacceptable.

Why the Clancy Comparison Matters

The Clancy proceeding illustrates the delicate distinction between encouraging deliberation and pressuring a holdout juror.

A report that one juror is preventing unanimity does not eliminate that juror’s independence. A lone juror may be wrong, unreasonable, or unwilling to engage—or may be the only juror adhering to a correct view of the evidence and the burden of proof.

The court must determine whether a juror is refusing to follow the law without investigating or penalizing the juror’s position on the merits. Removing a juror merely because that person disagrees with the other eleven would threaten the defendant’s right to a unanimous and impartial verdict.

The same concern explains why an Allen charge must be directed evenhandedly to both the majority and minority. The purpose is to improve deliberation, not to identify and overpower whoever stands alone.

The Practical Rule for South Carolina Trial Lawyers

South Carolina does not impose a fixed numerical cap on Allen charges.

The more useful rule is this:

A judge ordinarily may give an Allen charge after the jury’s first genuine report of deadlock. If the jury reports a second genuine deadlock, further deliberations require the jury’s consent or a request for additional instruction on the law. If the jury clearly states that additional deliberation will not help, the court should declare a mistrial rather than continue applying pressure.

The precise wording matters. So do the timing, the nature of the jury’s communications, the judge’s knowledge of any numerical division, and whether the parties were given an opportunity to object before deliberations resumed.

The events in the Clancy courtroom demonstrate why these rules matter. The justice system seeks a unanimous verdict, but not at the expense of independent judgment, the reasonable-doubt standard, or a fair trial.

Like dynamite, a deadlock charge must be handled with care.

Guy J. Vitetta, Esq. Charleston SC

Editor’s note: Because the Lindsay Clancy jury was still deliberating when this article was prepared, the procedural status should be updated immediately before publication.

This article is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.